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The purpose of this article is to examine the eﬀect of cognitive dissonance in a mixed
oligopoly where a local cooperative competes with an investor-owned ﬁrm (IOF) for
the local market. The article explicitly incorporates individuals’ beliefs regarding the
quality of the two organizations as a choice variable in the utility function and indi-
viduals trade oﬀ utility from beliefs against utility resulting from their actions. The
proposed model considers a case where managerial decisions or the introduction of
new products forces consumers to modify their initial beliefs regarding the (superior)
quality of their cooperative. Analytical results demonstrate the changes in equilibrium
that result from cognitive dissonance.
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Over the last years substantial structural changes in the agricultural sector gave rise to
a more challenging economic environment that is characterized by tougher competition,
stringent consumer demands and economic liberalization. These challenges, combined with
a declining member commitment and poor strategic decisions, helped undermine some
of the most prominent North American agricultural cooperatives; some of them ﬁled for
bankruptcy protection, some ceased operations while others were transformed to for-proﬁt
ﬁrms. Well-known examples include AgWay (Anderson and Henehan 2002; Fairbairn 2003)
and Tri-Valley Growers (Sexton and Hariyoga 2004) in the US, and the Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool (Lang and Fulton 2004) in Canada.
The recent decline of agricultural cooperatives highlights the relationship between a
co-op and its local community, since it is the commitment of their members that eﬀectively
diﬀerentiates co-ops from other organizational forms and enables them to successfully com-
pete in the marketplace (Fulton 1999; Fulton and Giannakas 2001). Changes in consumers’
beliefs regarding the role of cooperatives and their contribution, especially with respect to
local communities, can aﬀect members’ commitment and thus co-op’s market share.
The purpose of this article is to provide further insights into the relationship between
a cooperative and its local community and oﬀer a new approach to understanding the
1dramatic decline in market share that many US and Canadian cooperatives have suﬀered
over the recent years, a decline which can be at least partially attributed to declining
member commitment. Speciﬁcally, the objective of this article is to explore how changes
in the economic environment can inﬂuence consumers’ beliefs regarding a local co-op and
hence their buying behavior. The article considers the case of a mixed oligopoly where
a local cooperative competes with an investor-owned ﬁrm (IOF) for the market. Poor
managerial decisions from the co-op generate new cognitions for the consumers in a local
community that have to choose to either patronize the local co-op or an IOF. Previous
cognitions regarding the roles of the two organizations are now revised and consumers
modify their buying behaviors accordingly. Cognitive dissonance can play a critical role in
this setting, since consumers need to consider both pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements
that aﬀect their overall utility.
Consumers, either from ideology or from pragmatism, form a set of beliefs regarding the
organization they choose to patronize. In the case of cooperatives, many co-op members
are highly committed to their organization; they believe that the co-op is operating in
their best interests and therefore they attribute higher quality to its product (Fulton and
Giannakas 2001, 2006). Others perceive the co-op as an organization that enhances their
local economy and therefore a crucial institution for their community (Merrett and Walzer
2003). However, not everybody shares the same beliefs on the positive role of cooperatives
and some do not even consider them as being diﬀerent from any other business. In any
case, these beliefs are not impervious to changes in the economic environment, but instead
adjust over time in ways that are useful for the consumer.
Changes in the economic environment, including managerial decisions, introduction
of new products or services, and changes in prices or quality, will create new beliefs or
cognitions for the consumer. Consider ﬁrst a case where the co-op’s board undertakes
2consecutive poor managerial decisions. This might create doubts by its members regarding
the extent to which their cooperative is operating in their best interests and therefore have a
negative eﬀect on the perceived quality of the co-op product (Fulton Giannakas 2001, 2006).
Similarly, new investments from the IOF that result in products of relatively higher quality
will change individuals’ cognitions regarding the quality of the IOF relative to the co-op.
In both cases the individual consumer receives new information that makes her review
previously held beliefs regarding the qualities of the two organizations. The assumption
that consumers initially perceive their co-op as oﬀering a product of higher quality relative
to the IOF implies that there will be a discrepancy between their initial set of beliefs and
the new informational signal. Therefore, consumers will have to deal with contradictory
cognitions, where their initial belief on the higher quality of the local co-op is contrasted
with self-interest, or undertake actions that do not agree with previous held beliefs by
switching their business to the IOF. This situation gives rise to the discomforting feeling
of cognitive dissonance – a situation where the individual holds contradictory cognitions
or when actions and beliefs do not agree. In our article the source of cognitive dissonance
is something that happens in the market that decreases the perceived quality of the co-op
product. This change can be related to managerial decisions, introduction of new products,
or new oﬀerings that upgrade the perceived quality of the IOF. The quality of the IOF as
an organization is considered to be high when, ceteris paribus, the consumers purchasing
from the IOF believe that IOF is a superior organization compared to the local co-op – i.e.,
they have low valuation for the co-op. Alternatively the IOF’s quality is considered to be
low when consumers believe that the co-op is operating on their best interests. However,
switching from the co-op to the IOF creates cognitive dissonance since the consumer has to
recognize the fact that the IOF is better than the co-op, which contradicts with her initial
belief.
3The starting point of the model developed in this article is that consumers are het-
erogeneous in a number of ways, including their beliefs regarding the quality of the two
organizations. A modiﬁed rational-choice model for decision-making is employed where con-
sumers are assumed to have preferences over their beliefs and are partially able to choose
the belief that maximizes their utility. However, cognitive dissonance creates added costs
that aﬀect consumers’ perceived utility and their buying decisions.
The article is structured as follows. The next section introduces the main concepts
regarding cognitive dissonance and brieﬂy discusses some of its main applications in eco-
nomic literature. Next, a simple theoretical model of mixed oligopoly is presented where
consumers diﬀer in their attitudes towards the co-op and the IOF. The article then outlines
how the eﬀect of cognitive dissonance can change the equilibrium outcome and how changes
in belief can inﬂuence the equilibrium market shares. The article ends with a summary and
the conclusions.
Cognitive Dissonance
The theory of cognitive consistency has been one of the most inﬂuential theories in social
psychology (Jones 1985) – it has helped to chart a new course of research in decision-making
and has generated hundreds of research studies in the ﬁeld. Cognitive dissonance is the
most widely known and researched of cognitive consistency theories and was ﬁrst identiﬁed
by Leon Festinger (1957) as a psychological phenomenon where there is an inconsistency
between what a person believes, knows and values, and credible information that calls these
cognitions into question.
Festinger (1957) identiﬁes at least two kinds of dissonance. In the ﬁrst, dissonance
arises because the individual perceives two cognitions as being psychologically inconsistent
or contradictory; in the second, dissonance arises because of cultural or group mores when
4“culture or group standards may dictate that they do not ﬁt” (p. 13). More formally, two
related elements (x, y) that exist in a person’s cognition are dissonant if not-x follows
from y – i.e., the obverse of one element would follow from the other. According to this
theory, the inconsistency between any two cognitions (dissonance), being psychologically
uncomfortable, motivates the person to reduce the dissonance. The more important are the
cognitions, the greater is the magnitude of the dissonance; at the same time the greater
the magnitude of this dissonance, the greater is the impulse to reduce it. The main ways of
reducing dissonance include altering one’s behavior, seeking information that is consonant
with existing behavior, or distorting new information. Therefore, the theory of cognitive
dissonance not only predicts systematic diﬀerences in the interpretation of pre-speciﬁed
information sets but also biased receptivity to new information according to one’s beliefs
(Akerlof and Dickens 1982). Although the theory of cognitive dissonance is prominent in
social psychology, where it was intensively developed in the 1960s and 1970s, it was only at
the beginning of the 1980s that it begun to receive attention in the economics literature.
The model in this article shares a basic intuition with the main models in the literature
of rational-choice cognitive dissonance that started with Akerlof and Dickens (1982). In this
literature individual beliefs are modeled as choice variables in a person’s utility function and
individuals trade oﬀ utility from beliefs against utility resulting from their actions (Dickens
1986; Nagler 1993; Rabin 1994; Montgomery 1994). In many cases additional factors such as
conformity or uncertainty are incorporated to further modify the basic model. Nevertheless,
these economic models are applied almost exclusively to individual decision-making and
ignore any institutional arrangements in the marketplace that may trigger such phenomena.
The model developed in this article is distinct from these approaches in that we examine
cognitive dissonance in a setting where a cooperative competes with an investor-owned
ﬁrm in a local market and where consumers have to choose the organization from which
5to purchase. In our model it is the unique characteristics of the two organizations with
respect to the local community that generate the dissonance.
A Model of Cognitive Dissonance: Cooperative vs. IOF
General Description of the Model
The concept of cognitive dissonance is captured by introducing preferences over preferences,
which means that agents now have preferences over their beliefs over the state of the world
they are in. An agent’s beliefs are assumed to be partially ﬂexible and are introduced
directly into the utility function as a choice variable. Individuals are assumed to form their
beliefs pragmatically and then choose their actions to maximize utility.1
The model looks at a two-period world consisting of a local cooperative and an IOF
that is the local branch of a multinational corporation. Consumers are able to observe the
qualities and the prices of the two products that are being oﬀered and then decide whether
to purchase a unit of good from the IOF or the local co-op. The model further assumes
that the IOF enjoys economies of scale and/or scope and therefore is able to potentially
oﬀer its product in a better price or to provide a higher quality.
In period one (benchmark case) both ﬁrms oﬀer physical identically products and com-
pete in a mixed oligopoly. However, the distinct features of the two organizations, due to
their diﬀerent nature, produce diﬀerent cognitions for the individual. Locally owned coop-
eratives, especially in rural areas, have historically played a critical role in local economic
development and are considered to be of vital importance for local economies (Merrett
and Walzer 2003). Moreover, it is documented (Fulton 1999; Fulton and Giannakas 2001)
that the commitment of their members eﬀectively diﬀerentiates cooperatives from other
organizational forms, like IOFs, that focus almost exclusively on proﬁts and serve the mar-
ket as long as it remains proﬁtable. The model adopts the standard presumption in the
6cognitive dissonance literature that people view themselves as “nice and caring persons”,
which implies that individuals care about their local community and want to support it.
Hence, consumers’ initial cognition is that the local co-op is a superior organization (i.e.,
oﬀers a better quality product) since it enhances the local economy and hence the local
community; this cognition is consonant with the cognition they have for themselves – i.e.,
that they are good persons that want to help their community.
In period two, consumers receive new information that signals that the IOF’s product
or service has became relatively better. For instance, this might be the case where the
IOF undertook new investments that enhanced the quality of its product relative to the
co-op. Alternatively, poor managerial decisions from the co-op can signal to its members
that their cooperative no longer operates for their best interest and therefore its perceived
quality decreases (Fulton and Giannakas 2001, 2006). This new information will account
for the cognitive dissonance eﬀect, since the decision to patronize the IOF implies that
the consumer chooses to experience a certain level of dissonance but get the beneﬁt of the
better price and quality. On the other hand, choosing to patronize the cooperative implies
that there will be no dissonance but the consumer will have to pay a higher price for an
inferior good.
In this setup, the individual is on the horns of a dilemma and she has to consider both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements that arise from her decision. The source of disso-
nance is the new information in period two that signals that the IOF’s product or service
suddenly became relatively better. This situation will result in a cognitive dissonance eﬀect
since switching to the IOF implies that the consumer needs to recognize that the IOF is
better than the co-op. Thus, in accord with cognitive dissonance theory, this customer will
attempt to reduce her dissonance by modifying the belief on IOF’s quality (i.e., reduce the
perceived quality of its product).
7Formal Model
In this section a formal model of cognitive dissonance is presented in which individuals’
attitudes are pliable. The diﬀerent cognitions that are associated with the two institutions
imply diﬀerences in the degree to which consumers perceive their choice to be consonant
with their beliefs and diﬀerent consumer valuations for the two goods. In other words, even
though both ﬁrms produce physically identical products, consumers attribute diﬀerent
qualities to them because of the diﬀerent cognitions that are associated with the organiza-
tions that produce them. In this setting, consumers are presumed to have personal beliefs qi
and qc regarding the overall quality of the IOF and the cooperative, respectively. Moreover,
to capture diﬀerent consumer attitudes toward these two diﬀerent types of organization,
the conventional assumption of consumer homogeneity is relaxed. Instead, consumers are
assumed to diﬀer with respect to a diﬀerentiating characteristic x that captures diﬀerences
in their income. Another interpretation for x is that it captures physical distance that each
consumer has from the two organizations. With this setup, each consumer has to decide
whether to purchase a unit of good from the IOF or the local co-op. Consumers spend a
small fraction of their total income to this purchase and they are uniformly distributed
with respect to x.
Consider then a consumer with the following utility function:
Ui = ¯ u − pi + qi − tx
Uc = ¯ u − pc + qc (1)
where Ui and Uc are the net consumer beneﬁts (overall utility) associated with purchasing
a unit of the product from the IOF and the cooperative respectively. The parameter ¯ u is
a base level of utility, while pi and pc are the prices charged by the IOF and the coop-
8erative, respectively, with pi < pc. Parameter t is a non-negative utility reduction factor
that captures the diﬀerence in utility obtained by consumers with diﬀerent values of the
diﬀerentiating attribute x. The greater is t , the greater are the diﬀerences in consumers’
utility from the two goods. One interpretation is that t captures transportation costs where
higher t-values suggest higher cost to consumers of shifting their business between the IOF
and the co-op; the larger is t, the less responsive are consumers to price changes. To ensure
positive market shares for the two ﬁrms, it is assumed that 0 < pc−pi−t < qc−qi < pc−pi.
In this model a consumer will choose to shop from the IOF as long as Ui ≥ Uc:
¯ u − pi + q1 − tx ≥ ¯ u − Pc (2)
where the parameter q1 captures the diﬀerence between the two qualities that consumers
assign to the two organizations for period one – i.e., q1 = (qi − qc).
Figure 1 illustrates the decision problem that consumers are facing. The downward
sloping curve graphs the overall utility when one unit of the good is purchased from the
IOF, while the horizontal line slows the overall utility when the good is purchased from the
co-op for diﬀerent values of the diﬀerentiating attribute x (i.e., for diﬀerent consumers).
The consumer with diﬀerentiating characteristic ˘ x given by:
˘ x =
(pc − pi) + q1
t
(3)
is indiﬀerent between buying from the cooperative and buying from the IOF since her
utility from consuming these two products is the same. Consumers who are then “located”
to the left of ˘ x (i.e., consumers with x ∈ [0, ˘ x)) purchase from the IOF, while those located
to the right of ˘ x (i.e., consumers with x ∈ [˘ x, 1]) buy from the cooperative (Figure 1).
When consumers are uniformly distributed with respect to their diﬀerentiating attribute
9Figure 1: Consumer decisions
x, the level of x corresponding to the indiﬀerent consumer, ˘ x, also determines the market
share of the IOF. The market share of the co-op is given by (1-˘ x). By normalizing the mass
of consumers at unity, the market shares give the consumer demands faced by the IOF, xi,
and the cooperative, xc, respectively (Mussa and Rosen 1978). Formally, xi and xc can be
written as:
xi =
(pc − pi) + q1
t
xc =
t + (pi − pc) − q1
t
(4)
Solving for pi and pc gives the inverse demand curves for the IOF and the co-op, respec-
tively:
pi = pc + q1 − tx
pc = pi − q1 + t − tx (5)
10In period one, consumers perceive the co-op’s quality as being higher, therefore q1 ≤ 0. For










pi = pc − tx
pc = pi + t − tx (7)
Introducing Cognitive Dissonance
In period two, new information signals that IOF’s quality increased relative to the co-op
such that q = q2 > 0; where q denotes the diﬀerence between the two qualities for period
two.
Each consumer is assumed to have a subjective valuation q∗ that characterizes the
perceived quality of the IOF relative to the co-op; q∗ is a non-negative parameter that is
then compared to q, the real quality. High values of q∗ imply that the IOF is considered as
a superior organization compared to the co-op, while lower values of q∗ signal a decrease
in the IOF’s relative quality.
A central theme in the theory of cognitive dissonance is the assumption of partially
ﬂexible beliefs that limits one’s ability to change her set of initial beliefs. Simply choos-
ing to forget past beliefs of q and act in a way that is inconsistent with those beliefs will
create cognitive dissonance. For our model, even though the price and quality of the IOF
is better, switching implies that the consumer now has to recognize that the IOF is su-
11perior to the co-op – something that is inconsistent with her previous belief (period one).
Whenever behavior is inconsistent with belief cognitive dissonance arises. Such a disso-
nance is unpleasant and the consumer will either choose to change her behavior or change
her beliefs.
In general, the level of dissonance d will be a function of q∗, the consumer’s subjective





over the range 0 ≤ q∗ ≤ q. For each consumer, prior to her choice to patronize the cooper-
ative or the IOF, q∗ starts oﬀ equal to q. Cognitive dissonance is modeled by letting each
consumer choose any value of q∗ in the range between 0 and q.
The decision-making process in period two involves two stages. In stage one, the con-
sumer chooses her belief on q∗ that minimizes her total cost. In stage two, she chooses to
buy from the IOF or the cooperative based on her belief on q∗ from stage one. To avoid
equilibria involving noncredible strategies, the problem is solved using backward induction
(Gibbons 1992).
To examine the impact of cognitive dissonance we need to further modify the consumer’s
utility function by adding the cognitive dissonance cost when the perceived relative quality
of the IOF equals to q∗. Assuming that cognitive dissonance has unit cost c, the cost
of dissonance is
q∗
q c. Therefore, a consumer who maintains a belief q∗ will have a utility
function of the following form:




Uc = ¯ u − pc (9)
12where all variables are as previously deﬁned. Notice that in the case of the IOF, the overall
utility is enhanced by the parameter q∗ that captures the extra utility due to the perceived
quality that is associated with doing business with the IOF in period two. Realizing q∗ > 0
will have a cognitive dissonance cost of
q∗
q c which gets larger for higher values of q∗.
However. in making their decision, consumers will trade-oﬀ the resulting dissonance cost
with the price diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms and the product quality. For instance,
choosing to believe in high q∗ (which is more likely to lead to a purchase from the IOF)
implies high dissonance cost but the consumer gets the psychological beneﬁt of q∗ and
pays only pi instead of pc. Choosing to believe that q∗ = 0 (which is more likely to lead
to a purchase from the co-op) implies zero dissonance cost but now the consumer loses q
and pays the higher price pc. In other words, consumers can take the right decision: shop
from the IOF and suﬀer some dissonance; or, they can take the wrong decision: avoid any
dissonance cost by shopping from the co-op.
For tractability, the analysis assumes that consumers are uniformly distributed between
the polar values of x. Each consumer buys one unit of the product and her purchasing
decision represents a small share of her total budget. In this setting, a consumer will prefer




pi − pc + tx
q − c
(10)
with q−c > 0. For any given x, consumers who choose q∗ that satisﬁes the above equation
shop from the local co-op compared to consumers who choose higher values of q∗ and
switch their business to the IOF. Notice that choosing to believe in low q∗ implies that the
consumer sets q∗ = 0; the rest will set q∗ =
q(pi−pc+tx)
q−c and shop from the IOF.
The consumer correctly perceives that choosing to believe in q∗ = 0 will result in making
the wrong decision and shop from the co-op. Therefore, choosing q∗ = 0 minimizes the
13dissonance cost; the cost of making the wrong decision (C1) is the diﬀerence between the
real utility that comes from the IOF and the utility of the co-op. Thus:
C1 = pc − pi + q − tx (11)
Alternatively, the consumer can pick a q∗ equal to the critical level of equation (10) and
shop from the IOF. She will then choose to believe in q∗ =
q(pi−pc+tx)
q−c ; the result of this
choice is that she suﬀers the minimum possible dissonance cost (C2), which is:
C2 =
pi − pc + tx
q − c
c (12)
The consumer will choose the value of q∗ that minimizes costs; hence she compares C1, the
cost of making the wrong decision, with C2, which is the dissonance cost. Accordingly, the
consumer should choose q∗ = 0 if C1 < C2 and choose q∗ =
q(pi−pc+tx)
q−c if C1 > C2.
For consumers who choose to believe in high q∗ and hence patronize the IOF:
c + tx < pc − pi + q (13)
which implies that the consumer with diﬀerentiating characteristic ˆ x, given by:
ˆ x =
pc − pi + q − c
t
(14)
is indiﬀerent between buying from the cooperative and buying from the IOF since her utility
from consuming these two products is the same. Consumers who are then characterized by
x ∈ [0, ˆ x) purchase from the IOF, while the rest buy from the cooperative.
Since consumers are uniformly distributed with respect to the diﬀerentiating attribute
x, the location of the indiﬀerent consumer ˆ x, will also determine the market share of the
14IOF; the market share of the cooperative is given then by (1-ˆ x). By normalizing the mass
of consumers at unity, the market shares give the consumer demands faced by the IOF, xi,
and the cooperative, xc, respectively. Formally, xi and xc can be written as:
xi =
pc − pi + q − c
t
xc =
t − pc + pi − q + c
t
(15)
Solving for pi gives the inverse demand curve for the IOF:
pi = pc + q − c − tx (16)
while the inverse demand for the cooperative is:
pc = pi − q + c + t − tx (17)
The equilibrium market shares and the demand curves for both the cooperative and the
IOF are directly linked with the cognitive cost (c) and the true quality (q). In the case
of the IOF the cognitive dissonance creates the extra cost of c that negatively aﬀects its
demand and its equilibrium market share. However, the new information in period two
results to a higher IOF quality and hence has a positive eﬀect on the two parameters (xi,
pi). Higher q (i.e., the higher is the IOF’s relative quality) and/or lower c imply that the
overall dissonance cost decreases and hence the overall perceived IOF quality will increase
– lower dissonance cost for given q∗ makes it easier for consumers to forget their high
valuation for the co-op. The opposite holds for the case of the cooperative; higher q and/or
lower c negatively aﬀect its market share since it is now easier for its members to switch.
Alternatively, lower q and/or higher c makes it harder to abandon the cooperative and
15implies strong ties between the co-op and the local community.2





Figure 2 illustrates how the dissonance level changes with respect to the diﬀerentiating
attribute x. The bold dashed kinked curve shows the eﬀective level of
q∗
q for every x.
The consumers that are located just next to the IOF (x ∈ [0,xλ]) have zero dissonance.
However, as one moves more farther from the IOF (x > xλ), consumers have to believe
in higher values of q∗ in order to shop from the IOF. The more far away one moves from
the IOF the higher the level of dissonance. The last IOF customer is located at x = ˆ x and
sets q∗ = q – i.e., the actual quality. After that point, the costs associated with shopping
from the IOF are too high and all consumers to the right of ˆ x set q∗ = 0 and buy from the
co-op.
Figure 2: Dissonance level
16An interesting result is the three consumer groups that arise in equilibrium. The ﬁrst group
is those consumers who are characterized by x ∈ [0,xλ]. They are the most fortunate since
they can “have their cake and eat it too.” They do not experience any dissonance (q∗ = 0)
and at the same time they take the right decision – i.e., shop from the IOF and take
advantage of the better price and quality of its product. The second consumer group is
those with x ∈ (xλ, ˆ x]. They also take the right decision but their overall utility is less than
the utility of the ﬁrst group since they also have to incur an increasing dissonance cost.
The last consumer group, where x ∈ (ˆ x,1], is the group that makes the wrong decision and
remains loyal to the cooperative. Although they do not incur any dissonance cost (q∗ = 0)
they pay higher price (pc) for an inferior good.
Comparing these results with the benchmark model from period one (equations 6 and 7)
shows the eﬀect of cognitive dissonance for the equilibrium market shares and the demands
that the two ﬁrm face (Table 1).
Parameter Period One Period Two













pi pc − tx pc − tx + q − c
pc pi + t − tx pi + t − tx − q + c
Table 1: Comparison of market shares and demands with and without dissonance
One question that can be asked is how the cooperative can eﬀectively respond in order to
adjust the equilibrium for its beneﬁt. Assuming that the co-op has no direct control on the
changes in quality, the only way to aﬀect the result is through c. Creating close ties with
the local community, increasing its members’ participation in its operations and keeping
17open channels with its member base will eﬀectively increase the unit dissonance cost that
a member will suﬀer in case she decides to shop from the IOF. In short, the stronger the
ties and everyday interaction between the co-op and its member base, the harder will it be
for them to shift their business to the IOF. In the case of smaller communities with closer
relationships among the individuals, these dynamics will be even stronger and therefore
it will be very diﬃcult for an IOF to compete. Consequently, the co-op will be able to
maintain its position in the market and even keep higher prices compared to the IOF.
One interpretation for the quality change in period two is that the IOF undertook
investments that increased the quality of its product. However, our results show that the
higher is c, the higher the increase in quality needs to be to have a positive eﬀect on IOF’s
equilibrium market share and demand. Therefore, in cases where the co-op has already
managed to create a high c, the IOF will have to undertake substantial investments in
order to enhance its position in the marketplace. Considering that higher investments
usually imply higher risk leads to the conclusion that it will be even harder for the IOF to
increase its market penetration and more likely for the co-op to maintain its market share.
Finally, notice that another interpretation for the IOF’s quality increase is that the
co-op did something that decreased its own quality relative to the IOF. This will be a case
where co-op members feel that their co-op does not operate for their best interest anymore.
In such a case, the unit cost of dissonance for abandoning the co-op will be minimum so it
may be fairly easy for an IOF to capture a much bigger share of the market.
Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to examine the impact of changes in the economic environ-
ment on consumers’ cognitions and therefore their buying behavior under a mixed oligopoly.
The analysis examines the case where consumers in a local community receive new infor-
18mation that signals the better quality of the IOF relative to their co-op. Consumers revise
their previous held beliefs regarding the role of the two organizations and choose the one
with which to do business. The model developed is distinct from the standard analysis of
competition and member commitment in a mixed oligopoly in that personal beliefs were
introduced as a choice variable in consumers’ utility function.
Analytical results illustrate that in the presence of cognitive dissonance both ﬁrms will
be aﬀected. High quality increases in IOF’s product will attract new customers that need
to decide if it is worth to switch or stay with the cooperative. Previous cognitions create a
bond between this consumer group and the co-op; breaking this bond and switching to the
IOF results in cognitive dissonance and hence added costs. Therefore, their decision-making
process will involve an assessment of the overall costs and beneﬁts of their decision.
The analysis also demonstrates that the relative magnitude of the unit dissonance cost
has an important eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome. When the increase in the IOF’s quality
is accompanied with relatively small dissonance cost, the IOF is more likely to increase its
market share. However, strong ties between the co-op and the local community will result
to higher dissonance cost and hence make it more diﬃcult for consumers to switch.
While this article demonstrates how cognitive dissonance can eﬀectively aﬀect buying
behavior and therefore equilibrium market shares, its results are dependent on a number of
assumptions. First, throughout the article it is assumed that the cognitive dissonance cost is
quite signiﬁcant and enters the modiﬁed utility function as a separate parameter. However,
this might not always be the case. For instance, having diﬀerent cognitions regarding the
IOF and the co-op does not necessarily imply strong preference for one or the other. People
may prefer to shop, say, from the co-op but that does not mean that they will necessarily
experience signiﬁcant discomfort when they take advantage of special oﬀers and shop from
the IOF. In this case, the cognitive dissonance cost might be negligible and hence have no
19impact in the decision-making process.
Second, the magnitude of cognitive dissonance is related to the importance of the
two cognitions. People that perceive the two institutions as indistinguishable will never
experience the dissonance. For them, buying from the co-op or the IOF is not related on
the way they feel about their community and their self-image. Therefore, they will simply
choose the organization that maximizes their utility without considering any additional
cognitive cost.
Finally, it seems more likely that the cognitive cost c will not be a constant, but instead
will change over time. This might happen because of new dynamics that will arise in the
local community through time. Moreover, the size of the co-op’s market share might also
have an eﬀect in c (i.e., c is endogenous) but this is subject for further investigation.
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22Notes
1The formation of partially ﬂexible pragmatic beliefs implies that these beliefs are most useful in utility
maximization. This approach is diﬀerent from the standard rational approach where individuals use the
Bayes’ law and form beliefs that reﬂect the world as it is. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) oﬀer a nice discussion
on this subject.
2In a case where q
1 6= 0, the eﬀect of cognitive dissonance on equilibrium market shares and demands
will depend on the magnitude of (q − c) relative to q
1. Equation (10) requires q − c > 0, therefore the IOF
will have a higher equilibrium market share and face greater demand in period two.
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